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Abstract 
 
Securing information is a key issue in the field of 
network security and cryptography is one of the most 
effective ways to enhance information security. 
Biometric cryptography is a technique using biometric 
features to encrypt the data, which can improve the 
security of the encrypted data and overcome the 
shortcomings of the traditional cryptography. This 
paper proposes a novel biometric cryptosystem based 
on the most accurate biometric feature -- iris. In this 
system, a 256-dimension textural feature vector is 
extracted from the preprocessed iris image by using a 
set of 2-D Gabor filters. And then a modified fuzzy 
vault algorithm is employed to encrypt and decrypt the 
data. Experimental results demonstrate the feasibility 
of the proposed system. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, more and more information is 
transferred through network and how to secure 
information has become a challenge issue in the field 
of network security. Cryptography is one of the most 
effective ways to enhance information security. The 
traditional cryptographic algorithms (AES, DES and 
RSA etc.), which encrypt information using cipher 
keys, are faced with some security problems. The 
simple keys are easy to be memorized while they are 
also easy to be cracked. And the complex keys are 
difficult to be cracked while they are also difficult to 
be remembered and have to be stored in somewhere for 
use, which can be stolen or lost. Biometric 
cryptography [1], which uses biometric features to 
encrypt the information, can overcome these problems. 
Currently, some biometric cryptographic algorithms 
have been developed based on fingerprints [2-4], iris 
[5-7], face [8], voice [9], signature [10] and palmprints 
[11] etc. 
Among the common biometric features, iris is the 
most accurate one and can be effectively used in 
biometric cryptography. Davida [5, 6] proposed an iris 
cryptographic method based on the error-correcting 
and hashing techniques. This method supposed that the 
errors of the iris templates used for encryption and 
decryption were no more than 10%. Actually, these 
errors should be up to 30%. And the stored error-
correcting code may leak biometric information. Hao 
[7] regarded the difference between the decrypting and 
encrypting iris codes as noises and used Hadamard 
code and Reed-Solomon code to correct these noises. 
The limitation of their system is that the security is 
somewhat low (the cracking ratio is 2-44). To improve 
the security, this paper proposes a novel iris 
cryptosystem based on iris textural features and a 
modified fuzzy vault algorithm, which have been used 
successfully in the fingerprint cryptography [12, 13]. 
 
2. Framework of the Proposed System 
 
Fig. 1 shows the frameworks of our system. The 
message to be secured can be any critical data, for 
example, cipher keys of traditional cryptosystems.  
During the encryption phase, the Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) codes of the message is 
firstly created and appended to the original message to 
form the mixed codes (MC). Then, the MC codes are 
encoded to form a RS codes using Reed-Solomon 
coding algorithm. After that, a textural feature vector 
(FV) is extracted from the encryption iris. Finally, by 
using a modified fuzzy vault locking algorithm, the FV 
is employed to lock the RS codes in a vault composed 
of two grids (named GirdB and GridC).We only keep 
the vault, while other information are discarded. 
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When decrypting, we extract a textural feature 
vector from the decryption iris to unlock the vault by 
using a modified fuzzy vault unlocking algorithm. And 
then, the standard Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm 
is used to get back the message and its CRC codes. 
Finally, we check the message with the CRC codes to 
judge whether the decryption is successful or not. 
 
 (a) Encryption phase 
 (B) Decryption phase 
Fig. 1 Framework of iris cryptosystem 
 
3. Feature Extraction 
 
We use the preprocessing method described in [14] 
to localize and normalize the iris. Considering that the 
upper eyelid, the lower eyelid and the eyelash often 
cover the iris, we define a region of interesting (ROI) 
as the inner 3/4 part of the lower half of an iris, which 
contains enough information to distinguish different 
irises [15]. We then normalize the ROI into a 
rectangular block of 256 × 64 pixels (shown in Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Preprocessing of iris 
 
A 2-D real Gabor filter is defined as following: 
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where f is the frequency of the sinusoidal plane wave, 
α and β are the space constants of the Gaussian 
envelope along x' and y' axis respectively, θ denotes 
the orientation of Gabor filter. 
The normalized iris image is filtered by a set of 2-D 
real Gabor filters with ??? 90450 ，，=θ  and ?135 . Some 
examples of the filtered image are shown in Fig. 3. 
And then each filtered image is equally divided into 
16×4 blocks. And for each block, the mean is 
computed. That is, we can get 16×4×4 = 256 values 
from an iris image. After normalizing each value to an 
integer in the range [0, 255], we can get a 256-D 
feature vector: 
),...,,( 25621 MMMV =                             (3) 
 
Fig. 3 Filtered images 
 
4. Encryption and Decryption 
 
4.1. Encryption 
 
After having gotten the vector of an iris, we can use 
the modified fuzzy vault locking algorithm [13] to 
encrypt the data. There are four key steps in the 
encryption phase:  
1) Compute the CRC codes of the message and 
append it to the message to form MC codes. 
2) Employ RS encoding algorithm to transfer the 
MC codes to get RS codes with length 256. 
3) Create a grid of 256×3, called GridC, and put 
each element of the RS codes randomly into 
GridC, following the rule that the ith element of 
RS codes be placed in the ith row of GridC. 
Then fill the rest of GridC with random 
numbers in an appropriate range to confuse the 
genuine data. 
4) Create another grid of 256×3, called GridB, and 
put each component of the iris feature vector 
into GridB, making sure that the order coincides 
with that of the RS codes in GridC. Then, fill 
GridB in a way that each row becomes an 
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arithmetic progression of distance equal to the 
tolerance value, which is designed to eliminate 
the differences of vectors extracted from similar 
images of the same iris. Extra experimental 
results show that it is suitable to choose the 
tolerance value as 16. 
The GridB and GridC are called a vault. And we 
only keep vault and discard any other information. 
Fig.4 shows an example of the encryption process.  
 
 
Fig. 4 An example of the encryption process 
 
4.2. Decryption 
 
When decrypting, we only need to know the correct 
order of the legitimate elements in GridC. The main 
steps to decrypt the information are listed as following 
[13]: 
1) Extract the feature vector from the decryption 
iris. 
2) Find out an order from GridB by selecting the 
elements in each row which is nearest to the 
corresponding element of the decryption vector.  
3) Get the RS codes from GridC according to the 
order in Step 2; 
4) Employ the standard RS decoding algorithm to 
get back the MC codes.  
5) Divide the MC codes into two parts: message 
and CRC codes and check the message using 
CRC code to judge the decryption success or 
failure. 
In order to eliminate the rotation caused during iris 
images collection, we translate the normalized images 
7 times (-6, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4 and 6 pixels), and use each 
translated one to decrypt. 
The decryption process can deal with the errors 
resulted from the difference between the genuine irises 
of encryption and decryption phase. For two vectors 
extracted from similar images of the same iris, the 
differences between most of their corresponding 
elements are less than the vault tolerance, which can be 
removed by Step 2. The differences of other 
corresponding elements which are bigger than the 
tolerance can be handled by using Reed-Solomon 
coding algorithm (Step 4).  
 
5. Experimental Results and Analysis 
 
To test the performance of our method, we use the 
public database CASIA Version 1.0 [16], which 
includes 108 different irises and each iris has seven 
images with 320×280 pixels in 256 gray levels. 
Because some of the pictures are defocused, motion 
blurred, or occluded by eyelids and eyelashes, we 
choose three images of each iris for experiments, in 
which two images are used for training, and the other 
for test. So, we have conducted altogether 108 (108×1) 
genuine decryptions and 11,556 (108×107) imposter 
decryptions. Fig. 5 shows the FAR and FRR Curves of 
this system with different error number which can be 
corrected by RS coding algorithm. Table 1 lists some 
typical FAR/FRR, the corresponding error number and 
the length of the MC codes. 
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Fig. 5 FAR and FRR curves 
 
 
Table 1 Typical FAR, FRR and error number 
Error 
Number 
MC codes 
Length 
FAR 
(%) 
FRR 
(%) 
62 132 0 8.3333 
63 130 0 6.4815 
64 128 0 4.6296 
65 126 0 4.6296 
66 124 0 4.6296 
67 122 0.0087 4.6296 
68 120 0.0173 4.6296 
 
 
To prevent the impostor from successfully 
decrypting the data, the FAR should be 0. According to 
Fig. 5 and Table 1, the error number can be chosen as 
64 and the corresponding FAR, FRR and the length of 
the MC codes are 0%, 4.6296%, and 128. According to 
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the theory of Reed-Solomon code, we can choose (256, 
128, 64) RS codes for error-correcting in our system. 
The possibility to recover the message from the 
vault without the genuine iris can be computed as 
following: 
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That is, the security of this system is similar with that 
of a cipher key with 137 bits, which is much better 
than Hao’s method (44 bits) [7].  
The FRR of our system is nearly 5%, which means 
that 5% genuine users have to present their iris more 
than one time for decryption. This may bring some 
inconvenience, but it still can be accepted. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This paper proposed a novel iris cryptosystem. The 
system extracted vector feature from iris and used the 
modified fuzzy vault algorithm to encrypt and decrypt 
messages. Experimental results show that the proposed 
iris cryptosystem can work effectively, and it is almost 
impossible to be cracked. 
In future, we will test the proposed system on a 
large database and devise more effective feature 
extraction algorithm for the iris cryptosystem. 
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